Colleagues,
Thanks for your enthusiasm and commitment to defining "God" and "evil" last night.
There are, broadly, two ways to formulate the problem of evil: the logical problem of evil and the evidential problem of evil. The logical problem of evil suggests that, if God were to have certain essential qualities and yet there is evil in the world, then the belief in such a God would be irrational. Mackie offers a formulation of the logical problem of evil; Plantinga responds with the famous “free-will defense.” Interestingly, the logical problem of evil is something that a majority of philosophers of religion consider to be “solved” by Plantinga. We will ask: Is Mackie’s depiction of the logical problem of evil sufficient? Is Plantinga’s response satisfying?
For many of you, this experience will be your first exposure to academic philosophy. Please refer to the handout I distributed last night about the structure of a philosophy paper as a guide. This will be, by far, our hardest week in terms of technical content. So, do not feel discouraged as you read; rather, know that it is our task as a class to work through the content together. To best prepare for this, though, you should put your eyes on these arguments before we meet. Give yourself time, underline and highlight liberally, reach out to me with questions, and know that it is very common to read a paper several times.
Required:
Mackie, J.L. “Evil and Omnipotence” from Mind, New Series, Vol. 64, No. 254 (1955), 200-212.
Plantinga, Alvin. “The Free Will Defense” from God, Freedom, and Evil (1977), 12-49.
Optional:
None