Colleagues,
For our final session, we will consider one of the most interesting auxiliary concerns to the problem of evil known as “divine hiddenness.” Divine hiddenness, as the name suggests, refers to the alleged fact that the existence of God is less-than-obvious to humanity. That is: If belief in a God can provide consolation for horrendous evils, or perhaps be a necessary requirement for salvation, how can theism justify God’s hiddenness in the world– and would God’s lack of obvious existence suggest a great evil on the part of God? Finally, we will wonder if arguments for God’s free will satiate or motivate any prior concerns.
Readings are below. *NOTE: The Schellenberg and Moser are contained in the same document. You are not required to read past pg 54, but the elenchus is carried after this point if you are interested.
Required:
Schellenberg, J.L. “Divine Hiddenness Justifies Atheism” from Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Religion, 30-41.
Moser, Paul K. “Divine Hiddenness Does Not Justify Atheism” from Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Religion, 42-54.
Optional:
Senor, Thomas D. “Defending Divine Freedom” from Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, 168-195.